What competing interests and responsibilities do policy makers have? How are conflicts between science and these other interests handled?
In 1975, Wisconsin Senator William Proxmire began a tradition, known as the “Golden Fleece” award to public officials or entities he saw as fleecing US taxpayers by squandering funds on what he saw as pointless projects. While such work does shine light on wasteful and unscrupulous Federal spending, similar emphasis on the obscure names and amounts of expenditures alone has resulted in a chilling effect of more mindful spending projects funded through similar mechanisms. Mindful of this distinction, Tennessee Representative Jim Cooper and other science advocates created the “Golden Goose” award in 2012 to honor science funding projects that sound ridiculous but have far-reaching implications for society.
A common and easy criticism made by partisan pundits of any political leaning is that the actions of an opposing party are often made in bad faith, particularly in the case of government spending. Any time a spending bill is earmarked, where money is directed to projects picked by Congress and not an agency, the policy is often and pejoratively called political pork. Representatives’ bringing home the bacon, as it were, can be particularly prone to criticism because earmarking subverts the peer-reviewed and competitive funding mechanisms typically provided by the Federal science agencies. Nevertheless, while some instances of Federal earmarking are rightfully criticized for their quid-pro-quo nature, it’s important to consider some questions prior to joining the dog-pile punditry: What competing interests and responsibilities are present? How are conflicts between science and these other interests handled?
In most instances, federal funding for science research and development is allocated via annual budget appropriations to the Federal Science agencies. Once allocated to these agencies, internal boards host competitive funding initiatives for the public to participate in. Within the National Science Foundation, for instance, calls for research proposals are published to the scientific community. Researchers throughout the country then submit applications that are rigorously peer reviewed and awarded based upon their scientific merit with the scientific community and broader impacts to the rest of society. Through this mechanism, the Federal government, via the National Science Foundation, is able to direct national research priorities though the general funding competitions it hosts while the scientific community selects which topics within these broad priorities are funded. Beyond the broad participation evoked in this model, the very same rigors of scientific publishing are replicated in the funding process.
However, this competitive mechanism is not without some complications that earmarked funding for science, research and development must overcome. For instance, because of the scarcity of research funding and that peer-reviews tend to be largely consensus driven, many risky, ambitious, or revolutionary research proposals may be passed over. Similarly, the competitive process may mean that over time Federal funding is only allocated to elite institutions leaving many smaller research enterprises without any funding to improve their abilities.
In response to deficiencies in the competitive peer-reviewed funding process, arguments have been made in support of earmarking as a means of allowing representatives to support specific and local research initiatives within their district that would otherwise not be funded. Nevertheless, this justification does not immunize the Representatives own motives for earmarking regardless of the residual benefit to the funds’ recipients.
Over the years, some coalitions, such as the American Association of Universities have called to end earmarking for fear that such ad-hoc funding undermines Federal research spending over all. Further, some have claimed that many earmarks have ended up as wasteful expense because a lack of proper vetting.
Federally Backed Rent-Seeking
For context, earmarks typically only comprise roughly 1% of the total discretionary funding. Another form of government spending that is less direct than earmarks but deserves equal consideration is Federally supported rent-seeking. Not to be confused with anything explicitly housing-related, rent-seeking is the economic term for an entity who’s given or lobbies for external help in a competitive market. In the table below, we’ve highlighted four key examples in which a special interest may be given, or lobby for, rent-seeking opportunities. As indicated in other sections, the forms of support beyond direct funding can be used to support budding but promising industries. However, just as earmarks may have well-meaning and thoughtful justifications, federally backed rent-seeking can also, but not always, be a form of quid-pro-quo among special interests.
In most cases, discerning Federal Pork from thoughtful spending will be up to whomever is assessing the policy. That being said, however, any justified expense or provision of the Federal government should be open to debate and scrutiny. Just as in cases of scientific dispute, openness, skepticism, and accuracy of such arguments for Federal support should be good indicators of sound governance and intervention.
References and Further Reading
- Engstrom, E. J., & Vanberg, G. (2010). Assessing the allocation of pork: Evidence from congressional earmarks. American Politics Research, 38(6), 959-985.
- De Figueiredo, J. M., & Silverman, B. S. (2007). How does the government (want to) fund science? Politics, lobbying and academic earmarks (No. 13459). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Van Biezen, I., & Kopecký, P. (2007). The state and the parties: public funding, public regulation and rent-seeking in contemporary democracies. Party politics, 13(2), 235-254.
- Porter, R., & Walsh, S. (2006). Earmarks in the federal budget process. In Harvard Law School, Federal Budget Policy Seminar, Briefing Paper (Vol. 16).
- Savage, J. D. (2000). Funding science in America: Congress, universities, and the politics of the academic pork barrel. Cambridge University Press.