What is the best level or form of government to address the policy topic? What competing interests are present?
As communal and non-exclusive goods, basic and applied research tends to be primarily funded by the Federal, as opposed to State governments. However, as discoveries and the influx of research monies to accomplish them can provide immediate economic advantages to their communities, States will compete to provide such opportunities. With this competition, the Federal government will get involved at times to ensure all States have a fair stake. Such cases can be further complicated with controversial research, such as stem-cell therapies that are thought of by some states as morally corrupt practices. Currently, there is a patch work of stem-cell policies across the States due to this controversy and the pressure of the Federal government for the States to compromise.
Aside from the Federal government being colloquially understood as the big stodgy buildings in DC, the Federal government, in its proper civics understanding, is the centralized collection of authority that splits its Constitutionally endowed powers with the disparate State’s governments. In particular, those powers delegated to the Federal government are encased in the Constitution’s first article while powers reserved to the States are defined in the Constitution’s 10th Amendment. When assessing science policy, a key question to ask yourself regarding this delegation of power is whether there are clear levels or forms of government to address then the science policy topic, and, among those relevant forms of government, what competing interests are at stake?
As luck would have it, provided in the Constitution is the “Supremacy Clause” stipulating that the Constitution, and with it the Federal Government, is the supreme power of the country. What this means is that in matters of conflict between a State’s use of its authority and the Federal Government, the latter’s authority preempts that of the States when challenged in court. For instance, if a State attempts to stop a certain kind of research but a Federal law aims to stop States from placing bans on research, then the States must stop their ban.
In many cases, the States’ deference to Federal law is non-controversial as States tend to expend their resources and authority on issues only relevant to the State itself while the Federal Government handles more universal concerns among the States. Significant conflict arises at the margins of this dilenation, however, as the self-interested actions of a state can adversely affect other states and the seemingly unifying actions of the Federal Government can disproportionately affect some states more than others. In most cases the specific conflicts come down to financial costs, but can also include consequences to a State’s sense of ethics, as the Stem-Cell case example shows.
"Laboratories of Democracy"
If you’re wondering why our government shouldn’t just opt for a single, central form of government or 50 separate authorities among the states, you’re in good company. This issue was at the forefront of debate during the creation of the country and remains hotly contested today. Despite the often contentious relationship between the Federal and States’ governments, today’s arrangement, much like a scientific experiment, is an attempt to compromise the consolidated, well funded ability of a central government with the myriad of locally conscious and focused States governments each experimenting with their smaller powers. As much as was suggested by Supreme Court Justice Brandeis when he claimed that each state ought to have the opportunity to experiment in its social and economic structure constituting 50 united, but distinct, “laboratories of democracy.”
Beyond the geographical limitations of the Constitution, the very same kinds of conflicts seen among states and the Federal government exist throughout the globe among geopolitical entities as well as coalitions, non-governmental organizations, private enterprises, demographics, and cultures. In some cases, as in international conventions or treaties, conflicting organizations or groups may be held to certain legal designations of authority. However, as such organizations can be a lot less dependent upon one another, like separate sovereign countries, the rule of law to alleviate conflicts of power is only as strong as the benefits or consequences of the law are compelling enough by the parties involved.
Often, when such conflicts arise inter or intra-nationally, the parties involved will make their concerns well known in court or declarations. Outside of that and where there is no clear legal precedent, there are a couple tips you can use to anticipate governance conflicts that may arise when writing or assessing policy.
The first tip involves obtaining a solid understanding of the different kinds of stakeholders who may have an interest in the policy. In the table above, we’ve provided a sketch of four dimensions of stakeholders within concentric circles to remind you of the various levels of governance and parties with each dimension (e.g., state and federal governments).
After you have an idea of the stakeholders involved, another tip is to consider the communal and exclusive implications of the policy.
By communal, we mean implications that affect not only those implementing the policy, but others as well. Similarly, the exclusivity of a policy means whether any benefits of the policy can also be obtained by other interested stakeholders.
In the table above we have provided some examples of each. In cases where a policy may cause adverse effects to another entity, you can anticipate that conflict will arise. You can also expect some reluctance to enacting a policy if it will result in benefits to other entities with or without their contributing to the efforts of the enacting party.
References and Further Reading
- Radin, B. A., & Boase, J. P. (2000). Federalism, political structure, and public policy in the United States and Canada. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 2(1), 65-89.
- Tarr, G. A. (2001). Laboratories of democracy? Brandeis, federalism, and scientific management. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 31(1), 37-46.
- Mintrom, M. (2008). Competitive federalism and the governance of controversial science. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 39(4), 606-631.
- Finnemore, M. (1993). International organizations as teachers of norms: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and science policy. International organization, 47(4), 565-597.
- Bovaird, T. (2005). Public governance: balancing stakeholder power in a network society. International review of administrative sciences, 71(2), 217-228.
- Flink, T., & Schreiterer, U. (2010). Science diplomacy at the intersection of S&T policies and foreign affairs: toward a typology of national approaches. Science and Public Policy, 37(9), 665-677.